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Abstract
In light of the shortage of healthcare professionals, many developing countries operate a de
facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which Community Health Workers
(CHWs) supplement service provision by fully qualified physicians. CHWs are relatively
inexpensive to train but can treat only a limited range of medical conditions. This paper
explicitly models a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision and characterizes the optimal
allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs, and implications for population
health outcomes. We analyze how medical migration alters resource allocation and
population health outcomes, shifting resources towards training CHWs. In the model,
migration stimulates health care provision at the lower end of the illness severity spectrum,
improving health outcomes for those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical
conditions who can only be treated by doctors are made worse off. It is further shown that
donor countries must be reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians
in order to restore aggregate population health to the pre-migration level , assuming that there
are increasing marginal costs in involved in replacing migrating physicians.
JEL codes: I15, I18 and O15
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1. Introduction
The steady increase in life expectancy experienced over the twentieth century is
unprecedented in the broad sweep of history. As recently reviewed in Cutler, Deaton and
Lleras-Muney (2006), average life expectancy at birth increased by almost 30 years in this
period. Nonetheless, a gap of 30 years persists at present between the average life expectancy
in rich and poor countries. While this gap is partly attributable to income growth disparities,
the bulk of the recent economic literature emphasizes the role of countries' institutional
ability and political willingness to adopt and make existing healthcare technologies accessible
to populations, as shown in Deaton (2011, 2013). This encompasses both quantity and
quality of care provided by health care systems, as shown by recent evidence (for example,
Banerjee et al, 2004 and references therein).
This view is broadly consistent with the marked differences in the burden of disease borne
by high and low income countries, reflected in the leading causes of mortality shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Leading causes of death in high and low income countries
HIGH
LOW
INCOME INCOME
Fraction total Fraction total
I. Communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions and nutritional
deficiencies
Infectious and parasitic diseases
Tuberculosis
HIV/AIDS
Diarrhoeal diseases
Childhood diseases
Malaria
Other
Respiratory infections
Maternal conditions
Perinatal conditions
Nutritional deficiencies
II. Noncommunicable conditions
Cancer
Diabetes mellitus
Cardiovascular diseases
III. Injuries

0.07

0.58

0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.87
0.26
0.03
0.37
0.06

0.34
0.04
0.08
0.08
0.01
0.05
0.07
0.11
0.02
0.09
0.02
0.33
0.05
0.02
0.16
0.09

Source: WHO, 2008
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Infectious and parasitic diseases, such as tuberculosis, diarrheal disease and malaria account
for around 35 percent of deaths in low income countries and less than 2 per cent in high
income countries. Maternal and perinatal mortality account for more than 10 percent of
deaths in low income countries and less than 1 percent of mortality in rich countries. Hence,
with the exception of HIV infection, the most prevalent conditions in low income countries
are treatable (and some preventable) using existing drugs, treatments and public health
interventions, most of them relatively inexpensive and not requiring cutting-edge equipment
and infrastructure.
The World Health Report 2006 (WHO, 2006) acknowledges that the provision of relatively
simple and inexpensive life-saving interventions, such as antenatal care, immunization and
treatment of diarrhea, tuberculosis and malaria, is seriously constrained by a shortage of
health workers in the developing world. Table 2 shows the density per 10,000 of population,
of fully qualified doctors in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2004.
Table 2: Density of doctors per 10,000 of population and medical emigration rates in Sub-Saharan Africa
Country of training
Doctors per 10,000 pop Doctors emigration (%)
Liberia
0.23
51
Zimbabwe
0.00
45
Ghana
0.90
38
Uganda
0.47
34
South Africa
6.92
34
Malawi
0.11
32
Zambia
0.69
28
Ethiopia
0.29
25
Somalia
0.40
23
Sudan
1.58
19
Tanzania
0.23
15
Rwanda
0.19
14
Nigeria
2.69
13
Togo
0.57
11
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the
0.69
11
Cameroon
0.80
11
Angola
0.80
11
Guinea
0.94
9
Sierra Leone
0.73
9
Congo, Rep. of the
2.51
9
Kenya
1.32
8
Senegal
0.95
6
Mozambique
0.24
6

Source: Data on physician density and emigration used in Bhargava and Docquier (2008, 2012)
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With the exception of South Africa, all the countries listed fall considerably short of the
minimum requirements set by the WHO (2006) as a pre-requisite for the accomplishment of
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although a causality nexus cannot be inferred
from the table, it also shows that many of these countries experience high rates of physician
emigration, many of them higher than 20% of the total number of fully qualified doctors in
the country.
To address this shortage of qualified doctors, many developing countries systematically train
and deploy Community Health Workers (CHWs) - a strategy recommended by the WHO
(2006). These countries operate a de facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which
CHWs, recruited from their communities and swiftly trained, supplement service provision
by fully qualified physicians. CHW programs have attracted growing attention in the recent
economic development literature (see Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee, 2013 and references
therein), but have not yet been systematically analyzed in health economics.
We explicitly model a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision, characterize the optimal
allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs and deduce implications for
population health outcomes. As shown in Table 2, many of the countries that operate this
type of system experience high emigration rates of fully qualified doctors. We analyze how
such migration affects resource allocation and population health outcomes, by altering the
effective cost of training doctors, thereby shifting resources towards training CHWs. We
show that this resource reallocation may benefit patients affected by illnesses treated by
CHWs, rendering worse-off sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions, which can only
be treated by fully qualified physicians. Finally, we show that donor countries must be
reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore
aggregate population health to its pre-migration level. This compensatory payment does not
prevent host countries from continuing to benefit from the importation of doctors.

2. Community health workers
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The term 'Community Health Worker' is a blanket term used to describe lay members of the
community who provide health services, following a short and targeted period of training3.
China’s “barefoot doctors” are arguably the first and most well-known of this type of health
worker. Launched in the 1950s, that program aimed at training lay community members to
provide primary health care in rural areas, where few qualified doctors wished to settle. The
Chinese example spawned a diverse range of healthcare programs throughout the developing
world: a (non-exhaustive) list of countries that rely significantly on CHWs for health care
provision is given in Table 3 according to a recent WHO report (WHO, 2010).
Table 3: Alternative designations for CHWs in developing countries

Coutry
Bangladesh
Peru
Pakistan
India
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burma
Nepal
Ethiopia
Ecuador
Colombia
Madagascar
Ghana
Bolivia
Egypt
Haiti
Iran
Senegal
Uganda
Kenya
Indonesia
Mali
South Africa
Uganda
Guatemala
Nicaragua

CHWs
Shasthyo Sebika
Agente Comunitario de Salud
Lady Heath Workers
Saksham Sahaya, Maternal & Child Health Promotion Workers amongst others
Community Health Agents
Women Group Leaders
Maternal Health Worker
Female Community Health Worker
Village Malaria Worker & Mother Coordinators
Malaria erradication workers
Malaria erradication workers
Nutrition workers
Nutrition workers
Nutrition workers
Raedat
Accompagnateurs
Behvarz
Nutrition Worker
Community Drug Distributor
Village Health Helper
Kader Posyandu
Village Drug-Kit Manager
Lay Health Worker
Community Reproductive Health Worker
Village Health Promoters
Brigadistas

Source: WHO (2010)
According to Lehmann and Sanders (2007), the most widely accepted definition of CHW is the one proposed
in WHO (1989): “Community health workers should be members of the community where they work,
answerable to the communities for their activities, supported by the health system but not necessarily a part of
its organization, and have shorter training than professional workers”.

3
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Known by a wide range of country-specific designations, CHWs receive different forms of
training and provide different types of care across countries. In most cases, however, their
length of training varies from 6 months to two years and is therefore limited to a subset of
conditions that a fully qualified doctor can treat. Systematic reviews of healthcare programs
based on CHWs, such as WHO (2010) and Lehmann and Sanders (2007), highlight their
involvement in outreach activities and curative care in the areas shown in Figure 1.
Predictably, these mirror the leading conditions contributing to the burden of disease
highlighted in Table 1: a comprehensive range of highly prevalent conditions whose
treatment rarely requires a fully qualified medical doctor and complex healthcare technology.
Figure 1. Main activities of CHWs in developing countries
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Source: Lehmann and Sanders (2007)

An important characteristic of CHWs is that they are members of the community in which
they work. They are thus less likely to attrite and, crucially in our analysis, cannot emigrate
and work as health professionals abroad, since their qualifications are not valid outside their
country4.
There is not an international market for CHWs since they are required to have profound knowledge of the
local communities, including knowledge of language and culture.

4
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3. Medical migration
Medical migration is frequently identified in the literature as a leading cause of poor health
outcomes (Bundred and Levitt, 2000) and short supply of healthcare (for example Ashton et
al., 2005) in developing countries. This view is generally shared by health policy officials and
officially endorsed by the WHO (World Health Report, 2006 - Chapter 5). It has been
rightly argued, as noted in Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), that the positive impact
of a higher retention of health professionals in donor countries on population health might
be hampered by the lack of complementary investments in drugs, equipment and
infrastructure that is endemic at present in many developing countries. Nonetheless, a
sufficient supply of health professionals remains a fundamental pre-requisite for sizable
improvements in health outcomes to be within reach, both in the short and the longer run.
Moreover, the majority of doctors who migrate from developing countries relocate to rich
countries. As shown in Table 4, the percentage of doctors trained abroad (most frequently in
developing countries) represents roughly one-third of the doctors practicing in the USA,
Canada, UK and Australia, and a significant share of other rich countries’ medical labor
force. Training of medical doctors is expensive even in developing countries: recent
estimates in Mills et al (2011) of the cost of fully training a doctor in Sub-Saharan Africa
range from $21,000 in Uganda to about $60,000 in South Africa, a cost which, in poor
countries, is typically borne by the government. Medical migration therefore implies a partial
loss of human capital investment, which is transferred free of charge to the host country, a
situation often deemed unfair, as argued in the World Health Report, 2006 – p.101:

(…)

when large numbers of doctors and nurses leave, the countries that financed their education lose a return on
their investment and end up unwillingly providing the wealthy countries to which their health personnel have
migrated with a kind of “perverse subsidy”

Table 4: Doctors trained abroad as percentage of practicing doctors, in select OECD countries
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Australia
Canada
Finland
France
Germany
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States

21
23
9
6
6
34
33
27

Source: WHO (2006)

3.1 Theoretical models
The idea that the attraction of the scarce skilled labor force of developing countries by rich
countries is fundamentally unfair has been the focus of the theoretical literature on the brain
drain since the late 1960s. As reviewed in Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2002) and,
more recently, in Docquier and Rapoport (2012), the 1970s theoretical literature examines
the welfare implications of this brain drain and emphasizes its detrimental effect on
developing countries. Stylized models of labor market integration developed in Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974, 1975), Rodriguez (1975) and McCulloch and Yellen (1977) indicate that, in
the presence of labor market rigidities, imperfect information, externalities and subsidized
education in developing countries, emigration of skilled workers affects developing countries
negatively. It hinders human capital formation, imposes on them important fiscal costs
associated with public provision of education, and, under specific circumstances, may further
lead to an increase in unemployment5. In order to compensate developing countries for
these negative effects, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) proposed an income tax paid by skilled
emigrants – the much discussed Bhagwati tax. This would be paid over and above their
income tax in the host country and the corresponding tax revenue transferred to the donor
country. The debate on the consequences of this proposal, as well as the relative merits of
different variations on the Bhagwati tax is ongoing6.
A more recent wave of theoretical models pioneered in the late 1990’s re-examines the issue
of brain drain in the context of dynamic models and proposes that migration may provide
5

Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) show that, under certain conditions, the possibility of emigration lead the
skilled workers of developing countries to bargain for higher wages, leading to an increase of unemployment.
6
See, for example, McCulloch and Yellen (1975, 1977) and, more recently, McHale (2009).
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significant positive incentives for skill formation, which might, in net terms, mitigate or even
outweigh the loss of human capital that occurs through emigration. Amongst the seminal
contributions to this line of research are Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998) and Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport (2001). Further theoretical contributions have emphasized
additional possible benefits, neglected by the earlier literature, such as migrants’ remittances,
which are a source of development finance in developed countries. This literature is
thoroughly reviewed in Docquier and Rapoport (2012).
The theoretical literature to date has thus largely focused on characterizing the implications
of migration of highly qualified individuals on those left behind and on human capital
formation dynamics in the donor country, which in turn can impact on its economic growth.
In this paper, we abstract from the question of how medical migration impacts on wages of
remaining medical personnel in the donor country, and focus instead on its impact on health
outcomes, both directly through the loss of qualified medical personnel, and indirectly,
through the endogenous shift in the allocation of public spending for the training of medical
personnel. To address this issue we explicitly model how both the level of expenditure on
health professional training and its allocation across CHWs and physicians impacts on health
outcomes, both in the aggregate and along the health status distribution. For parsimony and
in line with the first wave of literature on the brain drain, the proportion of emigrating
physicians is treated as exogenous.

3.2 Evidence
There is an extensive empirical literature on the overall effect of medical migration on
population health outcomes in donor countries. As data are relatively scarce, causal effects
are hard to establish and evidence is mixed. Despite these limitations, some associations are
well established. Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps (2008) show that medical migration is
associated with a worsening of child health outcomes in a panel of 98 host countries;
interestingly, their results further suggest that medical brain drain reduces the effectiveness
of foreign health aid to these countries. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) corroborate the
existence of a negative association between the migration of doctors and key population
outcomes: doubling the rate of expatriation of fully qualified doctors is associated with a 20
percent increase in adult deaths from AIDS.
9

While we focus on a distinct new channel through which medical migration can have a
detrimental effect on aggregate population health, the economic literature has also
emphasized channels for potential gain from migration, as mentioned above. First, medical
migration generates remittances: Kangasniemi, Winters and Commander (2007) examine a
survey of overseas doctors practicing in the UK in 20027; on average 45% of these doctors
sent remittances, on the order of 16% of their earnings, to their families in the donor
country. Although remittances may represent a significant source of income for some
families in donor countries, they do not directly improve health care quality, availability and
population health. Hence, we abstract from these in our model.
Second, doctors who emigrate may return with potentially valuable skills. Although
international data are insufficient for a rigorous assessment, Kangasniemi, Winters and
Commander (2007) provide useful evidence. Of the migrant doctors who reported to have
the intention to return to their donor countries, roughly 65% intended to work in the private
sector and almost 90% in urban areas. Returnees are thus unlikely to populate the most
impoverished areas in need of care. Moreover, given that 70 per cent of the burden of
disease in low-income countries is amenable to simple interventions, the relevance of newly
acquired skills in rich countries has been called into question. Overall, the evidence on the
hypothesized benefits of a return of doctors who emigrate is, at best, weak. Thus, for
simplicity, we abstract from this possibility in our model.
Finally, the recent empirical literature focuses on the plausibility theoretical possibility of
'brain gain', in the sense that the prospect of migration may increase incentives to obtain
education, thereby improving, rather than depleting, the stock of human capital. Our model
analyses resource allocation in the context of a fairly limited health budget, where the state
selects how many doctors to train from a sufficiently large, homogeneous pool of potential
candidates. We abstract from the possibility of a shortage of possible individuals to train,
assuming health-budget constraints bind. This assumption is plausible given the financial

7

The main donor countries represented in the sample were India (around 42%), Nigeria (8%) and South Africa
(roughly 7%). Other Sub-Saharan Africa countries were also represented.

10

constraints in developing countries, and because the empirical evidence suggests brain gain
effects are too small to affect the national stock of doctors8.

4. The model
This section presents a model of disease and optimal resource allocation to treat it using two
types of medical personnel, with and without medical migration. It aims at analyzing the
effect of medical migration on health outcomes, both directly through the loss of qualified
medical personnel, and indirectly, through the endogenous shift in the allocation of public
spending for the training of medics. This sheds light on the relative strength of the
mechanisms at play in different scenarios and the quantification of possible compensatory
measures. It can also be a basis for empirical work, once more detailed data on CHWs is
compiled and made available9.
We explicitly adopt a social planner’s perspective as we consider it to be particularly relevant
in our context. In most developing countries, the overwhelming majority of medical training
is funded and most often provided by the state: according to a large recent survey funded by
the Gates foundation - Mullan et. al. (2010) – in Sub-Saharan Africa over 80 percent of
medical school of all kinds are public and their curricula decided in light of local health
issues and priorities. Moreover, attendance at the minority of private schools operating in the
region is often heavily subsidized by the state. Mullan et al. (2010) also suggests that, in most
countries, budget constraints are clearly binding and constitute a severe obstacle to scalingup health professionals’ education10. Finally, the adoption a social planner’s perspective is
8

Mountford (1997) shows that brain gain hinges on two crucial premises: that migration prospects determine
decisions to enroll into medical school and that migrants are not strongly screened by the host country.
Kangasniemi, Winters and Commander (2007) find that, for medical migration towards the UK, the link
between migration possibility educational choices is likely to be weak and that host countries clearly creamskim the best applicants; neither of the two crucial premises is thus likely to hold. Bhargava, Docquier and
Moullan (2011) find only a small positive effect of migration prospects on the decision to undertake medical
training, clearly insufficient to generate a sizable effect on a county’s stock of doctors. As noted in Docquier
and Rapoport (2012), curtailing medical brain drain would, overall, increase staffing levels in developing
countries.
9
At the moment, simple estimates of the number of CHWs and their patients vary widely according to the
source of information. Important efforts are nonetheless being undertaken in order to compile such data (for,
for example by the One Million CHWs campaign: http://1millionhealthworkers.org ).
10
Budgetary constrains are associated with endemic shortages within medical and health science school
faculties, lack of equipment and essential infrastructure maintenance. This, in turn, limits the number of health
professionals, such as doctors and CHWs, trained in Sub-Saharan African countries.
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further justified by official WHO recommendations, the bottom line conclusion of which is
that “Only broad and inclusive multi-sectoral planning at the national level will allow the coordination
necessary to effectively scale up numbers and align health professional education with country health needs”,
WHO (2011, p.18).

4.1 Model set-up
Consider a population that suffers from illnesses of varying severity, denoted by s , where

s  1, ) . Let the health status of an individual with illness of severity s be

1
. Perfect
s

health is the state valued at unity, where s = 1 , and health status tends to zero as illness
severity tends to infinity. Moreover, the distribution of the severity of illness in the
population is given by a cumulative distribution function F(s) , defined on [1,) .
We assume there are two kinds of health worker: doctors and Community Health Workers
(CHWs). Doctors are indexed as type 1 and CHWs as type 2. A health worker of type i,
where i {1,2} , provides care of quality qi , where q1 > q2 . CHWs are capable of treating
illnesses in the interval [1, ŝ] , while doctors are capable of treating all illnesses. If a health
worker of type i expends time t treating a patient with illness of severity s , the health status
of the treated patient will be:

(1+ qit)
.
s

(1)

Thus, to bring a patient to full health, when she is treated by a health worker of type i ,
requires a treatment time of:
t=

s 1
.
qi

(2)

The time required is inversely proportional to the quality of the health worker. The cost of
training a health care worker of type i is ci . Define the quality-adjusted cost as ri = ci / qi .
We assume that:
r1 > r2 .

(3)
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Inequality (2) is the usual assumption that producing a valued output (in this case, quality of
care) comes at increasing marginal cost. We denote the budget available for training health
care workers by M , measured in country per capita terms. If mi is the fraction of the
population trained to be a health care worker of type i , then the budget constraint is:
c1m1 + c2 m2  M .

(4)

mi can be interpreted as the man-hours available to provide health care services of type i to

the population. The total time spent on patients by health workers of type i must therefore
not exceed mi .
We measure social welfare (as far as health is concerned) as the mean of the logarithms of
the health statuses of the population11. Define the post-treatment health status of an individual
with illness of severity s as h(s) ; of course, this depends upon the type of health worker
assigned to him, and the time spent on treatment. The social objective is then:


W =  log h(s) dF(s) ,

(5)

1

and the optimization problem is to decide how many doctors and CHWs to train, and how
to assign them to treating patients with various severities of disease. Note that, if everyone in
the population were brought to full health, then post-treatment health status would be

h(s) = 1 for all, and the expression in (5) would be zero. Therefore, in general, the
expression in (5) is negative, and we can therefore view W as the post-treatment burden of
disease in the population, for this is the precisely the amount by which disease reduces the
welfare of the population. Using this terminology, we can view




1

1

 log h(s) dF(s)   log(1/ s) dF(s)

(6)

as the amount by which the burden of disease in the society is reduced by health care.
A preliminary step for allocating resources optimally is the observation that:
11

More on the choice of the objective below.
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Lemma 1 Optimal use of health care resources implies that CHWs treat only patients with illness severity
in [1, ŝ] and doctors treat only illnesses with severity in the interval ( ŝ,) .
The first part of Lemma 1 is true by definition, since CHWs are incapable of treating
illnesses more severe than ŝ . It is the second part that is substantive; doctors will only treat
more severe illness. Intuitively, the increasing marginal cost of quality implies it is always
more cost-effective to allocate CHWs to less severe cases12. For the proof of Lemma 1 and
subsequent theorems see the Appendix.
The complete resource allocation problem is to choose functions t1 (), t2 () and numbers
m1 , m2 to maximize13
ŝ

 log(
1


1+ q2t2 (s)
1+ q1t1 (s)
) dF(s) +  log(
) dF(s)
s
s
ŝ

subject to constraints (i)-(v), where Lagrangian multipliers are listed in parentheses:
ŝ

(i)  t2 (s) dF(s)  m2

( 2 )

1



(ii)  t1 (s) dF(s)  m1

(1 )

(iii) 1+ q1t1 (s)  s, s ( ŝ,)

((s))

(iv) 1+ q2t2 (s)  s, s [1, ŝ]

((s))

ŝ

(7)

t1 (s)  0, t2 (s)  0
(v) c1m1 + c2 m2  M

()

We define:
x

Q(x) = (1 F(x))x +  s dF(s) ,

(8)

1

12

It is interesting that this result applies generally, for all budget levels and distributions of illness, hinging on
the increasing marginal cost of quality of healthcare. This may explain why CHWs are trained and deployed
also in rich countries, such as the USA.
13
The objective function of program (7) can be written this way by Lemma 1.
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where Q is a ‘truncated mean’ function. It is now possible to characterize the optimal
resource allocation under certain premises. In particular:

Proposition 1 Suppose that:
(i) r1 > r2 , and

r
(ii) r2Q  1   r2 F ( ŝ ) + r1 1 F ( ŝ ) < M < r2Q ( ŝ )  r2 F ( ŝ ) + r1 1 F ( ŝ )
 r2 

(

(

))

(

(

))

Then the solution to program (7) is given by:

 (s  1) / q , s [1,s* ]

2
t2 (s) =  *
*
 (s  1) / q2 , s (s , ŝ]
r s* 1
t1 (s) = 2  , s ( ŝ,)
c1 q1

(9)

where s * is the unique solution of the equation:

M = r2Q(s* )  ( r2 F( ŝ) + r1 (1 F( ŝ) ) .

(10)

The values of (m1 ,m2 ) are given by constraints (i) and (ii) in program (7), both of which are binding at the
solution.

Qualitatively, Proposition 1 states that, under premises (i)-(ii), the optimal solution has the
following features: there is a severity s* in the interval [1, ŝ] such that CHWs spend
sufficient time on those with illness severities s [1,s* ] to completely cure them (i.e. raising
their health status to 1); for any illness with severity in the interval (s* , ŝ) CHWs spend a
fixed, unvarying amount of time (and so these patients are not brought up to full health).
Doctors treat all patients with illness more severe than ŝ , but again spend a constant

15

amount of time on each case, and bring none of these patients up to full health. Note, in
particular, that all patients receive treatment at the optimal solution.
The last sentence provides a justification for why we choose to maximize the average
logarithm of post-treatment health status.

If we had instead maximized the average post-

treatment health status (not logged), then, it turns out, the optimal solution entails that
patients at each illness severity s are either brought up to perfect health or are not treated at all.
Because we never observe this kind of bang-bang solution, it is more realistic to apply a
concave transformation to health status to form the health ministry’s objective.
Proposition 1 presents the solution to program (7) when the parameters of the
problem are in a set defined by premise (ii).

As is usual for such problems, there will be

different solutions to the program, depending upon precisely what the vector of parameters
is.

We do not attempt to provide a full characterization of the optimal solution for any

possible parameter vector: our task here is not to advise fully the health ministry, but to
show certain characteristics of the solution. Condition (ii) says that the budget M is not
too large and not too small. It is difficult to understand why the condition takes this
particular form without reading the proof.

We consider an example, with F(s) = 1

1
1
and f (s) = 2 , where f is the density of F .
s
s

Set ( ŝ,c1 ,q1 ,c2 ,q2 ,r1 ,r2 ) = (3,20,10.526,5,5,1.9,1) . Premise (ii) holds precisely when:

0.342 < M < 0.799.
Set M = 0.51 . Then solving (10) gives s* = 2.248 . Note that F( ŝ) =

2
, so CHWs treat that
3

fraction of the population. All patients with illnesses of severity less 2.248 are fully cured by
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treatment from CHWs. These comprise 55.5% of the population. The remaining patients
with illness of greater severity are treated, but not restored to full health. The optimal
supplies of the two kinds of medical personnel are m1 = 0.58% and m2 = 7.9% , reported in
population-percentage terms. In this example, there are many more CHWs than physicians.
We plot the pre-treatment and post-treatment health-status, as a function of s, for
the numerical example at the optimal solution, in Figure 2.

There are three regions: for

s < s* = 2.248 , CHWs treat patients to full health; in the region s* < s < ŝ = 3 , CHWs spend

the same amount of time on each patient, improving health status but not restoring patients
to full health; finally, for s > ŝ , patients are treated by doctors, who spend an equal amount
of time on each patient, again not bringing their patients up to full health. There is a saltus
downward of health status at ŝ , from (s* / ŝ) to

r2 *
(s / ŝ) .
r1

Figure 2. Health status, before treatment (light curve) and after treatment (dark curve) at the
optimal solution for numerical example
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In general, social welfare at the optimal solution can be computed based on equation (5) and
is given by:
ŝ

 1+ (r2 s* / r1 )  1
 1+ s*  1
W =  log(1) dF(s) +  log 
dF(s)
+
log
 
 dF(s) =

s
s


1
s*
ŝ
s*

 r2 s* 
*
log(s
/
s)
dF(s)
+
log

  r s  dF(s).
 1
ŝ
s*
ŝ



(11)

It is interesting that health status takes a saltus downward at ŝ = 3 . So patients whose illness
is slightly less severe than ŝ are ‘significantly’ better off, treated by the CHW, than patients
whose illness is slightly more severe than ŝ , who are treated by the doctor. This will not be
the case for all possible problems. Proposition 1 only characterizes the optimal solution for
problems characterized by premise (ii).

4.2 Medical migration
This section examines comparative statics of the optimal solution characterized in
Proposition 1 in the context of outward medical migration of doctors, who are trained at
public expense, but then take jobs in rich countries. In contrast, CHWs are assumed to
remain geographically immobile. These assumptions are backed by the strong evidence
presented in section 1, which points to high rates of outward migration of fully qualified
physicians from developing countries, whereas CHWs lack the formal qualifications to fill
medical posts abroad.
Denote by  the fraction of doctors who, after training, stay in the country, and by 1 
the fraction that migrates. The effect of migration in optimization problem (7) is simply to
change the effective cost of training a doctor from c1 to c1 /  . The effective cost of
producing m1 doctors who stay in the country is thus c1m1 /  (i.e. if one trains m1 / 
doctors, the number who stay will be (m1 / ) = m1 ).

4.2.1 Resource allocation with migration
18

In the case of Proposition 1, the equations that characterize the optimal values ( s*,m1 ,m2 )
are:
ŝ *
s 1
s 1
dF(s)
+
 q
 q dF(s)  m2 = 0
1
2
2
s*

(12)

((r2 s* / c1 )  (1/ q1 ))(1 F( ŝ))  m1 = 0

(13)

s*

r2Q(s* )  (r2 F( ŝ) +

r1
(1 F( ŝ))  M = 0,


(14)

which comprise three equations in the three unknowns ( s*,m1 ,m2 ) .

Equation (12) is the binding constraint (i) of program (7) at the optimal solution, (13) is
binding constraint (ii) of (7), and (14) is equation (10).

Throughout, c1 /  has been

substituted for c1 .

The Jacobian of this system with respect to these three variables is:


 F( ŝ)  F(s* )
0
1


q2


.
J =
r2 (1 F( ŝ)) / c1 1 0 


 r (1 F(s* ))
0 0 
2

We now differentiate the three equations with respect to  , which gives the vector:

0

*
r s (1 F( ŝ)) / c1
b= 2

r1 (1 F( ŝ))


2



.
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By the implicit function theorem, the derivatives of the optimal values of ( s*,m1 ,m2 ) with
respect to  are given by:

 s* / 

 m1 / 
 m / 
1

 s* / 

or J  m1 / 
 m / 
1




1
 = J b,


(15)



 = b . Solving these three equations for the derivatives at  = 1 gives:

s*


=
=1

r1 (1 F( ŝ))
r2 (1 F(s* ))

<0

r2 s* (1 F( ŝ))
m1
(1 F( ŝ))2
=
+
>0
 =1
c1
q1 (1 F(s* ))
m2


=
=1

r1 (1 F( ŝ))(F( ŝ)  F(s* ))
c2 (1 F(s* ))

(16)

<0

This means that as  decreases from a value of one, s* increases, and more CHWs are trained.
Because m2 increases as  decreases, it immediately follows from the budget constraint that
m1
> 0 , a fact that can also be calculated from (16). In sum, we have shown:


Proposition 2. Under the premises of Proposition 1, as the fraction of migrating doctors increases from
zero, then:
(a) the number of CHWs trained increases,
(b) the number of doctors trained decreases,
(c) those will illness severity s  ŝ receive more treatment in aggregate, and
(d) those will illness severity s > ŝ receive less treatment.
The effect on the burden of disease from migration of doctors is, of course, of key interest.
We thus compute the effect on burden from migration. From equation (11), when migration
is included, we can write welfare at the optimal solution as:
20

ŝ

W () =  log
s*



s* ()
r s * ()
dF(s) +  log 2
dF(s)
s
r1s
ŝ

and so we compute the derivative as:

r1
ds*  1 F(s* ) 
dW ()
=
) > 0,
+
1
F(
ŝ)
=
(1
F(
ŝ))(1

d =1 d 
r2 s*
s*


(17)

ds *
where we used the expression in (16) for
and concluded the last inequality from the
d
fact that s * >

r1
. Expressing this change in welfare as an elasticity, we have:
r2

dW 
d W

 r2 s* 
= (1 F( ŝ))(1 * ) /  log(s / s) dF(s) +  log 
dF(s) .
r1s
r2 s
*

ŝ
s
=1
r1

ŝ

*



(18)

This can be illustrated using the example described earlier. Evaluating this elasticity in that
context gives:

dW 
d W

= 0.078 .
=1

This means that if  falls from one to 0.9, welfare will decrease (or the burden of disease
will increase) by approximately 0.78%.
In general, the effect of an increase in physician migration on the number of doctors and
CHWs at the optimal solution for the country can be found by computing the elasticities of
m1 and m2 with respect to  . These are evaluated using the equations in (16):

dm1 
r2 s* (1 F( ŝ))
(1 F( ŝ))2
,
=
+
d m1 =1
c1m1
m1q1 (1 F(s* ))

(19)
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and

dm2 
d m2

=

r1 (1 F( ŝ))(F( ŝ)  F(s* ))

=1

c2 m2 (1 F(s* ))

(20)

As an illustration, in terms of our example, these elasticities evaluate to:

dm1 
= 2.37,
d m1 =1

dm2 
d m2

= 0.403 .

(21)

=1

In other words, a fall in the fraction of doctors staying in the country from unity to 0.9
reduces the number of doctors practicing in the country by 23.7 %, at the optimal allocation,
and increases the number of CHWs trained by 4.0%. Because of the effective increase in the
price of training doctors, the fraction of doctors trained falls (in this example) by more than
twice the loss due to migration. Moreover, from the first derivative in (16), the effect of
migration is to increase s* . The increase in the number of CHWs implies that patients with
illnesses in the interval [0, ŝ] actually are better off with some physician migration; they have
more CHWs to treat them. The brunt of the increase in the burden of disease is borne
entirely by patients with illnesses too severe for CHWs to treat. This result is comprehensible
if we recall that the objective of program (7) is to maximize an average of ‘utilities’ in the
population. As doctors become effectively more expensive due to the leakage of migration, it
is optimal to substitute CHWs for doctors: but since CHWs are constrained to treat only
relatively minor illnesses, patients with those illnesses have improved outcomes.

4.2.2 Health outcomes with migration
Let us return to our example. Now we incorporate outward migration by assuming
 = 0.9 and =0.75 ; that is, 10% or 25% of the doctors migrate. Solving for the new

severity threshold and optimal resource allocation between training doctors and CHWs
allows us to graph the post-treatment health status distribution these two levels of migration.
We graph the post-treatment health status of the population optimal solutions with and
without migration in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Health status at zero migration (dark curve) , 10% migration (gray curve) and 25%
migration (lightest curve) as a function of s at the optimal solutions

The effect of migration on the post-treatment health distribution summarized in Proposition
2 can be observed in the figure. Patients who are treated by CHWs actually do better with
migration – that is, more of them are restored to full health. Patients whose severity is
greater than ŝ do worse. In other words, migration induces the Ministry of Health to cut
back on doctor training, and shift resources towards training more CHWs. The threshold s *
increases with migration, as we saw in (16). The overall burden of disease, of course,
increases – for this example from 0.6588 to 0.6637 at 10% migration, by 0.74%, which
agrees well with the estimate based on the elasticity of welfare at  = 1 , given above, of
0.78%.
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In general, the basic intuition behind these patterns, driven by (16), is as follows. Increasing
migration is reflected in an increase in the effective cost of training doctors – for the cost of
training a doctor who will be available in the country is

c1
. Consequently, an increase in


migration increases the relative cost of the more expensive healthcare input, and so the
Ministry economizes by hiring fewer of them. In fact, after migration, in the optimal solution,
the Ministry spends less in total on training doctors than before, implying more expenditure
on training CHWs given an unchanged budget. This is why those who are not severely ill
actually benefit from the migration of doctors.

4.2.3 Resource allocation and health outcomes with migration and
reimbursement
Now suppose migrating doctors are taxed to pay back the cost of their training, or the donor
country receives a reimbursement from the countries to which they migrate, equal to the
cost of their training. Migration thus increases the budget available to the Ministry to train
doctors and CHWs, giving rise to a new optimal resource allocation.
Let n1 be the number of doctors who are trained. The number who stay to practice in the
home country is m1 = n1 .

The cost of training the physicians who migrate is c1 (1 )n1 .

We now assume that this amount is reimbursed to the Ministry of Health by the rich
countries to which their doctors have migrated.

Therefore the budget constraint for the

Ministry becomes:
c1n1 + c2 m2 = M + c1 (1 )n1 or c1 (n1 ) + c2 m2 = M .

(22)

The new optimization program for the Ministry is exactly the same as program (7) except
that the budget constraint (v) is replaced with equation (22) and constraint (ii) is replaced
with:


 t (s)dF(s)  n .
1

1

(23)

ŝ
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But this new program is identical to program (7) except that m1 has been replaced with

n1 .

Therefore, the solution to program (7) (without migration) will be identical to the

solution of the new program, with n1 = m1* , where m1* is the optimal supply of physicians
in program (7), absent migration. Thus, if the cost of training the migrants is reimbursed to
the home country, then there will be no change in medical care or the burden of disease.
However, there is an important ceteris paribus assumption hidden here – that increasing the
number of physicians that the home country trains will not decrease the quality of trained
physicians. More medical schools will be needed, the applicant pool will be larger, etc., so in
all likelihood the ceteris paribus assumption is false.

This means that, in reality, the home

country should be reimbursed more than the cost of training the migrating physicians, if its
burden of disease is not to increase.
It is clear that if the home country is reimbursed less than the cost of training the migrants,
then the burden of disease increases there, for this would be equivalent to decreasing the
medical budget from the case of full reimbursement, which therefore must decrease the
value of optimization program.

5. Conclusion
A shortage of medical personnel has been addressed in developing countries through the
systematic training and deployment of CHWs who supplement healthcare provision by fully
qualified doctors. Our analysis develops a model of a two-tiered structure of healthcare
provision and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and
CHWs, as well as the implications for population health outcomes. Outward medical
migration of physicians distorts the cost of training doctors relative to geographically
immobile CHWs, thereby shifting resources towards training CHWs. Since CHWs can only
treat a limited range of illnesses, the additional investment in training of CHWs can only give
rise to additional treatment of relatively low severity illness.
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While migration increases the burden of disease in society overall, it stimulates health care
provision at the lower end of the illness-severity spectrum, improving health outcomes for
those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions who can only be treated by
doctors are made worse off14. This provides insight on an important policy debate, centered
on whether foreign aid should be used in system-wide interventions, aimed at strengthening
the entire health system, or, rather, on disease-specific programs, aimed at particular health
conditions, such as AIDS or malaria (see Warren et al. 2013). Our results show that patients
affected by diseases that require the attention of fully qualified doctors are particularly
harmed by medical emigration. This provides a novel justification for disease-specific
interventions.
We show that, under a ceteris paribus assumption, if the donor country is reimbursed by the
training cost of emigrating physicians, the overall burden of disease in society is maintained
at its pre-migration level. Because the ceteris paribus assumption does not take into account
the increasing marginal costs of expanding medical schools, and the decrease in the quality
of medical students if the applicant pool is enlarged, in reality the donor country must be
reimbursed by more than the cost of training its migrating physicians to remain whole.
In a hypothetical world where donor countries could prevent migration, the number of
emigrating doctors and the level of reimbursement would be the outcome of a bargaining
game between donor and host. In such a setting, the donor country would be reimbursed by
more than is required to restore overall population health. This provides a normative
justification for the view that recipients of fully qualified medical personnel through
migration should substantially compensate developing countries.
In the previous sections we present this reimbursement as lump sum transfer. This need not
be the case, as demonstrated by recent doctors retention policies, such as Malawi’s
Emergency Human Resources Programme (EHRP). As shown in Table 2, the density of
physicians in this country is low and, simultaneously, a large share of the doctors trained in
14

Several middle income countries achieved important increases in life expectancy through cost-effective
primary care provision, relying heavily on CHWs. However, this cost-effective strategy is insufficient for
tackling more severe non-communicable diseases that typically require treatment by fully qualified doctors, as
made clear in a recent OECD policy report about China (OECD, 2013).
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Malawi emigrate. In order to curtail this deficit of medical personnel, international partners,
namely the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, supported Malawi by providing aid (over 100
million dollars between 2004 and 2009) used to subsidize retention policies for doctors
(DFID, 2010). First, EHDR provided a substantial top-up of salaried medical doctors in the
country (roughly 50% of their before salary), in order to reduce the incentives for migration.
Second, EDHR funded the training of medical doctors; this policy is associated15 with a large
increase in the number of medical doctors on training in the country16.
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Appendix
Proofs of theorems are provided below.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose doctors spend time t(s) treating patients with illnesses in the interval
s (s1 ,s1 + )  [1, ŝ] . The outcome for this group of patients is
s1 +

 1+ q1t(s) 
 dF(s) .
s

 log 

s
1

(A1)

s1 +

The cost of this treatment is c1  t(s) dF(s) = C1 . Now let tˆ(s) =
s1

q1t(s)
, and let these
q2

patients be treated instead by CHWs with treatment times tˆ(s) . The welfare outcome is
identical but the cost of treatment is:
s1 +

c2 

s1

q1t(s)
cq C r
dF(s) = 2 1 1 = 2 C1 < C1 ,
q2 c1 r1
q2

(A2)

where the inequality follows from assumption (3). Hence it is not optimal to treat these
patients using doctors. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
1. Observe first that Q(x) = 1 F(x) > 0 , so Q is increasing.
2. The proof is based on the fact that program (7) is a convex program. Define the
Lagrangian function:
ŝ

 1+ q2 (t2 (s) + t2 (s))
 1+ q1 (t1 (s) + t1 (s))
dF(s) +
dF(s) + log 
L() = log 
s
s
1

ŝ

ŝ


 2  m2 + m2  (t2 (s) + t2 (s)) dF(s) + 1  m1 + m1  (t1 (s) + t1 (s)) dF(s) +
ŝ

1

*

s

1

1

(s) ( s  (1+ q2 (t2 (s) + t2 (s))) )dF(s) +  ( M  c1 (m1 + m1 )  c2 (m2 + m2 ) )

where the functions t1 (s),t 2 (s) and the numbers m1 and m2 comprise the candidate for the
*
optimal solution of the program. If we can produce a non-negative function () on [1,s ]
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and non-negative constants (1 , 2 ,) such that L(0) = 0 at the values of these variables
stated in the proposition, then the proposition is proved. For this will mean that the
concave function L is maximized at  = 0 . In the Lagrangian function L the functions
ti (), i = 1,2, are arbitrary feasible variations from the conjectured optimal solution, as are
the numbers mi .
2. Evaluating the derivative at zero:
ŝ

q t (s)
q2 t2 (s)
dF(s) +  1 1
dF(s) + 2 (m2   t2 (s) dF(s)) +
1 1+ q2t2 (s)
1
ŝ 1+ q1t1 (s)
ŝ

L(0) = 



s*

ŝ

1

(A3)

1 (m1   t1 (s) dF(s))  (c1m1 + c2 m2 )   (s)q2 t2 (s) dF(s).
If we can choose non-negative Lagrangian multipliers (1 , 2 ,) and a non-negative
function (s) on [1, s * ]

so that the coefficients of (t1 (s),t2 (s),m1 ,m2 ) are all

annihilated, then the result is proved.
3. The coefficients of these variations are:
t2 (s) :

q2
 (s)q2[1,s* ]   2 = 0, for s [1, ŝ] . [a,b] is the function that is 1
1+ q2t2 (s)

on [a,b] , and 0 elsewhere;
t1 (s) :

q1
 1 = 0
1+ q1t1 (s)

m1 : 1  c1 = 0
m2 :  2  c2  = 0
4. From the t 2 condition, we have (s) = 
(s * ) = 0 , implying  2 =

=

2 1
+ for s [1, s * ] . At s * , we choose
q2 s

q2
. It follows that (s) > 0 for s < s * . Therefore
s*

q2
1
c1
c1
r2 s *
and
so
Therefore
,
giving
=

=
.
(1+
q
t
)
=
q
t
=
(
 1) / q1 .
1
1 1
1
1
c2 s * r2 s *
r2 s *
r2 s *
r1

For t1 to be positive we require s * >

r1
, which we will attend to below. We must also
r2
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check that we are not treating patients with illness severityt s > ŝ with more treatment than
they require: that is, we want 1+ q1t1  ŝ .
5.

But this is true because s * < ŝ <

r1
ŝ .
r2

We now check the budget constraint for the proposed solution, which is:
ŝ *

 r2 s *

s 1
s 1
c2 
dF(s) + c2 
dF(s) + c1   (
 1) / q1  dF(s) = M .
q2
q2
r1
1
ŝ 
s*
s*

This can be written as :
s*

r2  (s  1)dF(s) + r2 (s *  1)(F( ŝ)  F(s * )) + (r2 s *  r1 )(1 F( ŝ)) = M
1

which in turn is equivalent to condition (10) defining s * . Finally, our premise (ii) is exactly
the condition that tells us a unique solution s * exists to equation such that

r1
< s * < ŝ .
r2

This is so because the function Q is monotone increasing, and the existence of s * therefore
follows from condition (ii) by the intermediate value theorem. 
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